The background of diplomacy and Franco-British control over Tsarist decision-making is not explored, but as a military analysis the book is penetrating and thoroughly enjoyable.Access-restricted-item true Addeddate 08:07:22 Autocrop_version 0.0.12_books-20220331-0.2 Bookplateleaf 0004 Boxid IA40452305 Camera Sony Alpha-A6300 (Control) Collection_set printdisabled External-identifier
Against this background, the German commander Ludendorff in particular is derided for puffing his tactical gains into brilliant strategic breakthroughs. Stone sees Russian military entropy in the context of the general problem of WW I: Nineteenth century progress could provide mass armies with food and railroads but, past the rail terminals, communications and mobility were still primitive, especially for the Russian side.
Petersburg administrators, who in any case were largely devoted to obsolete ""fortress"" concepts. The book presents intricate but lucid mappings of the factions within the Tsarist government and army-power slipped to far-flung commanders, away from the St. Russian output of key materiel expanded during the war, and its large, modern industries were not themselves to blame for the economic chaos which, to Stone's regret, produced the November revolution of 1917. His two most important arguments: the shortage of shells blamed by the Russians for their defeats by the Germans was essentially a problem of army command and supply structures, not a ""crippling material weakness"" on the part of the Russian economy and, indeed, the Russian economy itself was suffering a crisis of growth, not decline. Stone proceeds to dispatch the cliches one by one. An elegant study of an aspect of WW I-the Russian campaign against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians-which has generally been relegated by military historians to a series of overworked postscripts.
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